Director of the Command and General Staff School

November 19, 2026 • 00:39:57
Director of the Command and General Staff School
The Spear
Director of the Command and General Staff School

Nov 19 2026 | 00:39:57

/

Show Notes

In this episode, Colonel Richard J. Ikena Jr., director of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, reflects on nearly three decades of Army service, including five combat deployments and leadership assignments across four infantry divisions. Drawing on his experiences as a field artillery officer in Iraq and Afghanistan, he discusses the importance of rehearsals, clear commander’s intent, and disciplined initiative in combat, as well as the challenges of employing fires while minimizing collateral damage. Colonel Ikena also examines the enduring lessons of counterinsurgency operations and their applicability to large-scale combat operations, emphasizing the importance of mastering fundamental warfighting skills before integrating new technologies. Recalling his experiences commanding the Mission Command Training Program, he explains how effective staffs support commanders' decision-making and why understanding the preferences and processes of higher headquarters is essential. He also discusses how the Command and General Staff School prepares field grade officers for the uncertainty and complexity of future warfare through professional military education, critical thinking, and practical application of doctrine. Throughout the conversation, Colonel Ikena emphasizes the importance of repetition, shared understanding, effective communication, and the distinction between training for certainty and educating for uncertainty.

Chapters

View Full Transcript

Episode Transcript

[00:00:02] Speaker A: This is the SPEAR the Story of the Profession of Arms, a production of the Modern War Institute of West Point, brought to you by the west point class of 1984. Welcome back to the Spear, the story of the Profession of Arms. Today's guest is Colonel Richard Akenna, Director of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. Sir, thank you for hosting us today and welcome to the show. Oh, thanks for having me. [00:00:22] Speaker B: I'm looking forward to the conversation. [00:00:24] Speaker A: Sir. You've had a long and distinguished career as a field artillery officer and now are the director of the Command and General Staff School. We'll get to your current job shortly, but first, can we get a quick origin story? Why did you decide to join the army and why make it a career? [00:00:37] Speaker B: Sure. No, I appreciate that. So just about to hit my 29th year of service. I'm a third generation military member. Both my grandfathers served. My dad's dad in World War I, my mom's dad in World War II, and then my father also served in the Korea era and actually my father in law also served in the Vietnam era. And so I've been around the military my whole life. We lived in Niceville, Florida, right outside of Eglin Air Force Base, as my father was the Department of the army civilian and so have been exposed to the military mission pretty much my whole life, as much as I can remember from both family and the community that I lived in. And so I always also liked to travel and had a desire to travel. And so it just seemed very natural, a natural fit to join the Army. And then as I've spent time in the army, the inner dynamic of being part of a team and doing something that is greater than myself or a little bit of the background and context, [00:01:44] Speaker A: sir, over that 29 year period, you served in combat a number of times, including going to Iraq four times. And you were serving in a bunch of different positions as the war evolved. Take us back to one of those deployments. Was there a particular operation or engagement that fundamentally changed how you understood the battlefield, the enemy, or your responsibilities as a leader? [00:02:04] Speaker B: No. I appreciate that. So five combat deployments over the course of my career. Each one of them were different, but yet at the same time, as I've reflected on it a little bit, I would take you back to my second deployment to Iraq in 2004, 2005, really. It was a year long deployment and the inner dynamic of contact with the enemy and actually fighting. And so you can plan and prepare all day long, but ultimately when you get to execute and it was a rough deployment. Our Brigade lost over 40 of our teammates over the course of that year. And so not only the execution of combat operations, but then also working through the resiliency and the challenge of losing teammates, really throughout that entire deployment was a roller coaster and a challenge. And as I, as I reflect on the first contact, the many contacts that we had, thinking through, ultimately, I think through the inner dynamic of rehearsing and the importance of rehearsals, as well as understanding what the intent of the operation is. Because as the bullets start to fly, as the IED went off, all that can get jarbled very quickly. And so understanding what the mission is, what you're trying to achieve with the intent, and then ultimately having hopefully rehearsed as much actions on contact as possible. Obviously counterinsurgency operations are a little bit different, so they tend to be more predictive than large scale combat operations, but at the same time making sure that the team is rehearsed to those actions, recognizing that there's a good amount of unpredictability with contact. [00:03:55] Speaker A: Sir, I'm here as part of a delegation of West Point cadets that the CAC has generously agreed to host here for a couple of days. One of the classes they're sitting in on is a joint planning process. And when you were addressing the candidates upstairs, you talked about the seven principles of mission command. You mentioned specifically shared understanding, him and commander's intent. You mentioned it again just now. So as someone who's spent 29 years in the army and has written to the position of 06 in your job as director here at CACT, how do you make sure that you're sending the message in a way that it's going to be received? Accuracy. What are your techniques to make sure that your leader's intent is properly conveyed and understood? [00:04:35] Speaker B: So from my experiences, I think being clear and simple and intense, the environment that you're operating in may be complex, but at the tactical level, really being as simplistic as possible. Because as you gain contact, again, a lot of things get very unpredictable. But if you have clear directions, intent, and then as part of your rehearsals, you're rehearsing actions on contact, but, but you have the context of the why that you're doing something. And so to be able to, to reestab yourself either to escalate or potentially de escalate is, at least in the experiences that I've had, super important, is to be clear and simple. [00:05:29] Speaker A: Sir, you spent much of your career in the field artillery, including the counter insurgency campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Can you describe a combat situation where the employment of fires or the decision not to employ them had a particularly consequential impact on the outcome of an operation? [00:05:45] Speaker B: Sure. A good amount of things to kind of reflect upon to. I would go back to that second deployment in Iraq in 2004, 2005. A good amount of what we did, fires wise in counterinsurgency operations was counter fire or counter mortar operations. And so getting into the inner dynamic of being as predictive as possible. A lot of the cells that were in the areas that were operating tended to operate in some kind of cyclic manner. And so working through the analysis of, of when they potentially would attack us with indirect fire and then making sure that we had the right things in place so that we could counter that with fire as rapidly as possible. Obviously there was a good amount of that that was unpredictable, but trying to create as much predictability as we could with our radars, queuing in certain directions, certain areas, based on what was going on within the cities or the areas of operation, and then making sure that we had our gun prepared, the cannons prepared to fire, and so things like that. But then the inner dynamic of oftentimes these cells would become more advanced and would oftentimes tuck themselves into civilian infrastructure so that we either couldn't or wouldn't fire back. I can think of a couple of inner dynamics where we'd have a mortar cell that would tuck into an apartment complex or to a schoolyard. Counter fire with artillery was a method, but not the only method. And so when you looked at the combined arms aspect of what we did, countering that fire, whether that was with artillery, which was obviously my main focal point, but then the inner dynamic of having ground maneuver also as an option. And so it became very much a combined arms operation. So that if they were firing from a schoolyard or from critical infrastructure, making sure that we had the QRF ready, or ideally the security forces from Iraq or Afghanistan available to counter that threat was the ideal circumstance. That, and depending on the inner dynamic, if it was 3 o' clock in the morning, typically that was not an option, but it just depended on the scenario. But working through the rules of engagement, working through collateral damage assessments back when I was a brigade fire support officer was something that I learned a tremendous amount from. Got a lot of repetition over the course of those 12 months. And then kind of fast forward to 2015, as I was the Baghdad Strike Sale director at a much higher echelon with much more capability, just not cannon artillery, but rocket artillery, a lot of joint air aspects that were flying with the error cap in Operation Inherent Resolve. And so what I found was a lot of time collateral damage assessment is generally speaking the same. The science of it is the same. But it changes urgency of it changes the echelon that you're at. And obviously we were enabling the Iraqis in 2015. And so to clear fire in 2004, generally speaking was to clear with our own forces, whereas clearing the ground in 2015 wasn't really our forces, it was our partners, the Iraqis. And we were not as engaged on the ground as the Iraqis were in 2015. So making sure that they could clear an area was a different same process, but executed differently, but having the same diligence to make sure that before we released either an artillery round, a rocket or a bomb from the air, that we did as much as we could within the rules of engagement to have the effect that we were trying to have to minimize collateral damage as well in the process. [00:10:19] Speaker A: Sir, thinking back to the conversation you had upstairs with cadets earlier this morning, you mentioned lisco large scale combat operations and the answer that you just gave, it occurred to me that there might be some distinct differences in the way that you and I fought the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly when it comes to fires, compared to what we're preparing the next war for. In terms of lisco, what lessons, if any, do you think from your experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan will still be applicable in a LISCO environment? [00:10:50] Speaker B: So I think the fundamentals of planning and preparing the scale I think will be different and the due diligence of making sure that you've got a decision making process to enable commanders to make decisions, I think are the same. Within counterinsurgency operations, that tends to be very limited and very microscopic oftentimes. Whereas in large scale combat operations I think the process is still the same, but it is in a much larger area of operations and we are likely not going to be able to control everything like we attempted to do in counterinsurgency operations. And so I think there are similarities making sure that we have a protected target list that we're aware of at echelon so that we can go the battle drill is still the same to okay, something went into a no fire area or came out of a no fire area, so how do we deal with that? But we're going to have probably hundreds if not thousands of no fire areas or potentially not depending on the rules of engagement. So I think those are things that I think can scale that the repetition and the Foundations of what we did will likely still apply. But I do think large scale combat operations, we're going to have to make difficult decisions. And so understanding the intent and ultimately to take either disciplined initiative or accept risk, I think that calculus will be different. Large scale combat operations. [00:12:32] Speaker A: Yes, sir. Sir, Your career has taken you through the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions. That's an unusually broad range of experiences across different organizations and operational environments. Can you share a specific experience in which something you learned in one division proved especially valuable or perhaps completely wrong when you applied it in another? [00:12:52] Speaker B: Thanks for that. So it has been very neat to be different infantry divisions over time. I would go back to my first duty station in the 2nd Infantry Division, and so to fight tonight. And the inner dynamic on the Korean peninsula has always been something that has resonated with me. I actually rotated back to Korea to be part of the 2nd Infantry Division again as a battalion commander. And so it was pretty interesting to see what had changed and then oftentimes what had not changed. And so when I was a lieutenant, we talked about fight tonight. When I went back as a lieutenant colonel, we slightly modified that to fight and win tonight. And I think some of the differences. The army of the 90s had limited amount of combat experience, whereas when I went back in 2016 and 2017, the preponderance of our leadership had been in one or multiple deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. So the ability not only to fight tonight, but to fight and win tonight and to be decisive. And so a lot of the training that we did in Korea was very op plan informed. And so the realism of if things were going to occur, you actually trained oftentimes in the location that you would potentially be fighting in. And so that always resonated with me from my first assignment as an MLR splatoon leader. And so a lot of that built into the experiences that I had in the other divisions. The other one that I would highlight would be my second. I went from Korea to the fourth 2id ultimately the 4id to the mighty Ivy division when it was at Fort Hood, not at Fort Carson. How to say your army old without saying Your army old, but 4 ID at the time in 1999-2001 was the Force 21 Division doing the preponderance of the modernization work for our Army. And so we had a lot of experimentation that went on, which sounds very familiar to kind of our current environment, but it was for the army, it was limited to the 4th Infantry Division mainly. And so we did have, in order to test and field equipment, we had to ultimately know the fundamentals and the basics of what we were doing. And so we had a lot of time in the field. We put the field in field artillery, as we like to joke around about. But that time in the field, field really did get after the repetitions of the basics and fundamentals of what we needed to do as a combined arms team, and then we applied the technology or the new piece of kit to those basics and fundamentals. And oftentimes then, as well as potentially now, we would try to apply the technology without having those basics and fundamentals. And so it is so important to make sure that we're grounded in training on those basics and fundamentals first and then see how technology augments or enhances or enables things to be done differently. And going through that iterative process of continuous learning, learned a lot of that and, of course, infrastributed vision. [00:16:40] Speaker A: So you mentioned secondary division. I served there as a young officer, went back to Korea this past summer with the modern warsitude on what we call contemporary battlefield analysis. And I was thinking about those experiences. When you're talking about what's different and what's the same between your two experiences there, and I'm not sure if it was similar for you, but when we were there, it was a little nostalgic and a bit sad because all the places that we trained that I lived, my wife was there with me. She was also in second id. They're closed now, and they've been returned to the Republic of Korea. But what stayed the same from my perspective was that fight tonight. Fight tonight and win tonight. Spirit that you described, both on the Republic Korea, the rock side and United States army side, was that something similar that you experienced when you were there? Did you still see that fighting spirit in between those two different times on the ground? [00:17:32] Speaker B: Without a doubt. So both within. So it's now a joint combined division, which I think is success. Ultimately, we are continuing to be present, present as a deterrence, but we are, I think, more nested with our partners. And so it's the second combined division. And so the idea of it's just not us acting unilaterally. We do have the Koreans taking more and more of the lead. And so I think that's acting. So having places close, they may be close to what US Forces are doing, but the rock are expanding. And so I actually initially kind of felt the same way. Like, oh, we used to do this here. Well, that's now a neighborhood or that's now an enhanced Infrastructure. But at the same time, I think that is almost what success looks like. As the peninsula continues to normalize itself and as we're doing more by, with and through our ROC partners, as ultimately that mission continues to evolve into a rock led mission. [00:18:50] Speaker A: That makes a lot of sense, especially if one of our main focuses there is to do deterrence. If the partner force is more and more able to deter on their own, then we can go do deterrence and shaping operations somewhere else. Sir, after commanding the 1st Infantry Division Artillery, you took command of the Army's Mission Command Training program at Fort Leavenworth in 2023. Based on your experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan and Europe, can you recall a particular training exercise or warfighter scenario where you saw a commander or staff struggle with a problem you had personally encountered during an actual deployment? [00:19:21] Speaker B: When I was at MCTP in the Mission Command training program, ultimately every warfighter exercise is different. We build every warfighter exercise to ultimately meet the unit where they're at and make them better. So we craft the training objectives in order and fit it into a scenario based on the unit, based on their mission set in order to stress that unit and make that unit better in the crucible of a combat training center environment. And so I would say that every unit, as it works through building its team, ultimately has got to get to know one another and get to know their commander. And so a division staff or a corps staff is a relatively large organization, but ultimately they are there to enable decision making by the division commander. And so every unit does that differently. But oftentimes we talk about a battle rhythm for a unit. Not a battle defined, a rhythm, but a battle rhythm. And so you want it to be a statement, not a sentence. And so oftentimes units battle to find a rhythm. But ultimately the battle rhythm is established in order to have a critical path for information, for ultimately the commander to make decisions. And so every unit does that differently. There are some best practices out there depending on the environment, but ultimately it is commander centric. And so I think understanding the critical path of information and, and how to synchronize operations are something that units always wrestle with. I hesitate to use the word struggle because at the end of the day, it is a balance of art and science that the commander and staff have to work their way through. And then figuring out the authorities associated with who does what in a given scenario is also something that are pretty central to warfighter exercises. What I would also say is what I coach chiefs of staff on at the division corps level is the inner dynamic of what process does your commander default to? You have the operations process and the targeting process. And targeting process is ultimately part of the operations process, but oftentimes they are mutually supporting processes. But ultimately, commanders typically default to one or the other just based on what they are most comfortable with. And so what I challenge chiefs of staff to do as they are building their staffs to enable decision making for commanders is what does your boss feel most comfortable with? So that they can kind of lean on one or the other, but it's not only that internal to the unit. So once a chief determines how their boss does that, how does your higher headquarters make decisions? And if your boss is a targeting process person, but their higher headquarters is an operations process centric commander, you have some challenges to make sure that the processes are as synchronized as possible in order to enable decision making not only at your echelon, but above you, and that you also have to communicate with all the echelons below you, which gets after kind of the shared understanding that we talked about a little bit earlier. And so making sure that things are as flat as possible is super important as there are processes on processes within a battle rhythm, making sure that you have clear and shared and common understanding of what you're doing, not only internally to your organization, but as a good teammate up and down the chain of command. [00:23:28] Speaker A: It's interesting you mentioned the operations process focus commander versus the targeting process focus commander. I haven't heard that expressed like that before, but while you were talking, I could think in my own mind, commanders who are very much one or the other, being able to understand not only what your commander does, but as you said, what the higher level commander is, helps shape the staff and shapes the process. And I got to imagine it also reduces a lot of frustration. If you're planning for an operations process focused commander, you're giving them products for it, but they are actually targeting process focused or vice versa. So that's very interesting. [00:24:06] Speaker B: It is. And ultimately, you've got to kind of get after, get after that in training to work the reps and the sets. So as you go through the command post exercises leading up to a warfighter and get to know again, not only your team, but the team above you and below you. What you feel comfortable with may not be what you need to do in order to ultimately resonate with your higher headquarters, because when you're on a division stage staff, you oftentimes think, you know, I'm the king of the world and what I say goes. But recognizing that your higher headquarters has multiple Divisions, sometimes ally and partner divisions, you know, that fit within the context of whatever theater that you're operating in. And so understanding that context is, I think, very critical to your processes. If your higher headquarters makes decisions at X meeting, that is at noon every day, you need to build yourself around making sure that you can enable your commander with decision ability ahead of that noon meeting. Sometimes some commanders are okay getting it 15 minutes ahead of that meeting at noon, and some commanders may want multiple hours to iterate on it. You just have to understand that inner dynamic and figure out that critical path both internal and above and below you, which, again, sounds very simple. Certainly is challenging in execution, [00:25:40] Speaker A: sir. As director of the Command General Staff College, you have a unique opportunity to observe officers at a critical point in their professional development. Looking at these students coming through CGSS today, what impresses you most about this generation of army leaders? And what, if anything, concerns you? [00:25:56] Speaker B: So I would tell you, this cohort that comes through Command and General Staff is extremely impressive. We've got about a little over a thousand folks that are in the residence course, but we have almost 5,000 a year that go through our distance learning program. And what I would say is everyone that comes into the course, whether that's the residence course or the non resonance course, their hunger to learn and to educate themselves is extremely impressive. And so you do not get selected to come here in the residence course or go through the non residence course without advancing into the field grade ranks. And so extremely successful direct level leadership at the company grade level. And then this course challenges you from an education perspective, from a professional military education perspective, to educate you on the unknown and ultimately the operation, or, excuse me, the organizational level leadership associated with operating at the division or higher level. And so everything that we do is built around our two major outcomes, which is war fighting and leadership. So we're focused on war fighting at the division and higher level, multiple repetitions throughout our curriculum, at the division level, and then ultimately organizational level leadership, which we do in various ways, whether that's directly talk and teach leadership, whether that's giving historical context, which is extremely important, because oftentimes nothing has been done for the first time. The actual tool or capability in which someone is doing may have changed, whether that's the rifle all the way to the drone. But ultimately, history can teach you a great deal as we go through the ever changing character of war. But the nature of war fundamentally is pretty grounded. And so I just think that what impresses me the most is as we unveil the curriculum and Ultimately, the faculty facilitate the development of our students. The hunger and the professional appetite to get better is really what has resonated with me in my first period of time here in this role. [00:28:25] Speaker A: So you mentioned the nature and character of war, and that's something we talk with cadets a lot about. I've been very impressed as someone who didn't go to school at West Point, but has taught there on and off since 2013, what cadets are actually thinking about relatively early in their careers. And on this trip that we've taken out here to visit with you all, we've got some extraordinarily talented young West Point leaders of all grades. And they're asking these types of questions already. And they are very concerned about potential for going back to trench warfare and of course, drones and AI and how that's driving the battlefield. And one of the questions they asked me that was very impressive was about whether or not we think we're saturating our young leaders, particularly platoon leaders, which I realize you don't train here, they've done that much earlier in their careers. But even for these majors that are coming through your course, how are we making sure that we are preparing them for what they need to bring to the units they're joining without giving them so much that they can't possibly absorb it all? [00:29:25] Speaker B: Yeah. So I think that the operation environment, the operational environment, is very challenged. And so giving them the different tools associated with stepping their way through either problem framing or problem solving through the military decision making process. We also teach them a complexity toolkit when they first get here. And that complexity toolkit gets after critical thinking, creative thinking, which is ultimately problem solving, systems thinking, as well as some data literacy and some basic fundamentals of artificial intelligence, but ultimately giving them the tools to be able to frame a problem or solve a problem, and as you frame a problem, ultimately that that operational design to frame a problem steps and triggers the military decision making process. And those seven steps are certainly super critical at the organizational level and then taking that at the right tempo. And so sometimes you have to do things quickly. And so speed is super important that you only have so much time to do something. So you don't want to take all your time planning, because the more time you take planning, potentially the less time you have to prepare. And preparation is extremely important when it comes to the tactical level. And so making sure that you give the best context that you can give within the time allotted in order to ultimately allow people to prepare and to rehearse. When it comes down to the Platoon level. I would say the most critical thing that a platoon does as they go through the eight step training model. The eight step training model is just not for training. It really is for operations in order to prepare, to rehearse certain things, to give context to certain things, in order to be able to step into execution as prepared, as competent, with the critical tools and capabilities as possible. [00:31:33] Speaker A: So, sir, I realize we're the home of army doctrine here at Fort Leavenworth, and it sounds what you're talking about right now in terms of planning and preparing sounds like the doctrinal 1/3 2/3 planning rule, where you have 1/3 of the time for planning that I take as a leader, I turn 2/3 over to my subordinate forces for them. I wonder also about something that's not doctrinal and that I think that you and I are in the same wavelength about. I'd like to get your opinion on. One of the things I stress to cadets or young leaders of any type is, especially in extremist situations, we have to get very comfortable with coming up with a good enough plan quickly. If we take too much time for the perfect plan, it's going to fall apart at the first contact anyway. Is that something that you stress through things like your complexity toolkit and the planning and organizing war fighting structures and exercises that you do here at the cac? [00:32:28] Speaker B: Without a doubt. I think when you're on a division or core staff, you've got to realize that you're there to enable ultimately the decision authority for any number of things. Oftentimes you as a staff officer are not the decision authority. And so one, understanding who the decision authority is is important. Whether that's the chief of current operations, whether that's the chief of staff, whether that's a deputy commander, and then ultimately to make sure that whatever your piece of the puzzle is, you understand whatever that is, that you're as competent as you can be. Whether that's being doctrinally sound, because doctrine does give us a common language that obviously you can shift from as the operational environment potentially changes. But being doctrinally sound is extremely important and we get as many repetitions in doctrine in this course as possible. Understanding that the operational environment may change some of that language, but ultimately doing the best that you can within your function and how it fits into the grander scheme of decision making at the division or core level, I think is extremely important. [00:33:38] Speaker A: Sir, one of the central challenges of professional military education is teaching officers how to exercise judgment when the situation is uncertain, especially when communications are disrupted. And higher headquarters can't provide immediate guidance. This type of organizational intellectual flexibility is extraordinarily important. You've experienced those challenges in combat and later helped train senior headquarters at the mission Command training program. How are you translating those experiences into the education of majors here at cgsf? And where do you see the greatest gaps between what officers learn in the classroom and what they'll actually face in combat? [00:34:12] Speaker B: So I think oftentimes we train for certainty, whereas we educate for uncertainty. We try to find a good balance of those two things in professional military education. Here at the Command and General Staff College, we start with the basis of the known and doctrine best practices of that doctrine. But then we. We quickly escalate into educating for the. For uncertainty. The complexity toolkit is one of those ways that we enable that to occur here in the schoolhouse. And so again, training is typically what to do in certainty, Whereas education is maybe how to think or how to problem frame or how to do something in uncertainty. And so trying to provide context and scenarios within the blocks of instruction at echelon that oftentimes our students have not operated at, whether that's division, corps level, whether that's the theater level or the joint level, Exposing them to that as much as possible ultimately will help enable them to feel a little bit more comfortable with the unknown. We don't want them to feel too comfortable with the unknown, but have the right tools, the right capabilities, the right frames of reference to ultimately able to enable their organizations to be successful. [00:35:36] Speaker A: Sir, throughout our conversation now and in the conversation we had earlier with the cadets, you kept stressing basics and fundamentals. And I hear that from a lot of senior army leaders. For those in our audience who are junior leaders, aspiring professionals, apprentices in our profession, how do young leaders get good at the basics? [00:35:58] Speaker B: That's a great question. And so I think ultimately staying nested with your leadership, with what the focus of your organization is, and then getting reps and sets at that. And so if you're an armor battalion, making sure that you understand what you need to be successful at gunnery and how gunnery applies at scale, whether you're a logistician and working through all the classes of supply and how those classes of supply need to be at the right, right place at the right time in order to enable operations, and so focusing on the things that only you can do at the echelon that you're at, understanding the context of why you're doing it. But sometimes you don't have the luxury of knowing exactly why you're doing something trying to glean that intent and then just reps and sets at whatever it is as often as possible. I would be my coaching to somebody that is focused on the fundamentals, understanding the environment that you're operating, understanding what the capabilities of your platoon or your unit or your organization are, and then again, ruthlessly getting after that with the repetition would be the way that I would coach folks. [00:37:12] Speaker A: Sir, this is our last question. Is there anything that you'd like to add to what we've already discussed? Are there any upcoming events or programs or courses that you think you're particularly excited about that you would like to announce to the world? World. [00:37:26] Speaker B: So I would say say no announcements necessarily. But the two things that I would leave folks with being grounded in 622 army leadership doctrine. The competencies and the attributes that are in 622 are the building blocks to leading in our Army. And understanding those and getting better at those, learning about those are extremely important. The other thing that I would stress is the value of communication. And oftentimes communication is broadcasting or most folks associate communication with broadcasting or talking. But it's just as valuable to be able to listen and to use your ears and mouth proportionally. And oftentimes that is something that we tend to forget about. And so listening as part of communication. The other part that I would emphasize is the value of written communication. Sometimes you don't have the ability to talk to somebody. Sometimes the only thing that you have is the commander's intent. That is written on the back of an MRE box with the sector sketch. And so having doctrinally sound tasks written out that everyone understands or an information paper about a certain thing. Written communication is something that that is sometimes a lost art and something that I think is extremely important as our army continues to roll along. [00:39:01] Speaker A: Sir, thank you for your time today and for the excellent hospitality of you and your staff. On behalf of Colonel Pat Sullivan, the director of the Modern War Institute, it's my pleasure to present you with this rare and coveted Modern War Institute coin. Thank you, sir. [00:39:14] Speaker B: Thank you, Foreign. [00:39:24] Speaker C: Thank you for listening to this episode of the Spear. The Spear is produced by the Modern War Institute at West Point. What you hear in each episode are the views of the participants and don't represent the position of West Point, the Army, or the US Government. Be sure you're subscribed to the Spear on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher or your favorite podcast app, where you can also give the podcast a rating or leave a review. Review which helps us reach new listeners. And if you aren't yet following MWI on social media. Please find us on Twitter, Facebook and LinkedIn. Thanks again for listening.

Other Episodes

Episode

October 11, 2024 • 01:28:56
Episode Cover

Emergency Deployment with the Ranger Regiment

While serving as a company executive officer with the 1st Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment in 2016, Ryan Crayne and his company were...

Listen

Episode

August 15, 2018 • 00:39:48
Episode Cover

Surviving an IED Blast, then Returning to War, Part 1

This episode features the first of a two-part conversation with Ryan Hendrickson. In this part, he shares a story from a 2010 deployment. On...

Listen

Episode 0

December 22, 2021 • 00:48:27
Episode Cover

Fire in the Skies Over Baghdad

In this episode, retired US Air Force Col. Kim Campbell joins to share a story from 2003. A career A-10 pilot, her squadron was...

Listen